THE TRUE CHARACTER OF DIVORCE SUITS.

the settled rule that publication is sufficient for the main purpose of the decree, I rather give a reason for sustaining the
decisions, in that respect, than controvert them. It is true
that I have dissented from a few decisions as to the effect of
divorce on the absent defendant, but, in doing so, I find myself in company with the great majority of those who have
rendered divorce decisions, and who sustain the doctrine that
the divorce of one of a married couple is the virtual divorce
of both.
So far from this paper being a mere theory, it is a diffident
attempt to reconcile differences, and to show that the current
of decisions, notwithstanding untenable obiter dicta and the
misuse of terms and the fallacies in reasoning often found, is,
in the main, consonant with the symmetry of legal science.
Manifestly, it was impossible, in a brief essay, to discuss or
even cite the many decisions sustaining the prevalent doctrine
in opposition to the controverted ones of New York.
RUFUS WAPLES.
Ann Arbor, Mich.
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CASE.

Tigh Court of Appeals.
LIVERPOOL HOUSEHOLD STORES ASSOCIATION v. SMITH.
Since the passing of the Judicature Acts, the Court has jurisdiction to restrain by interlocutory injunction the publication of a trade libel, but as, if
it grants such an injunction, it must pronounce the publication to be libellous
before it has been found so by a jury, the jurisdiction is to be exercised only
in the clearest cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained
of was libellous, and where, if they found otherwise, their verdict would be
set aside as unreasonable.
The question as to granting injunctions to restrain publication in a newspaper, of reports and correspondence containing unfavorable statements as to
the position and solvency of a joint stock company, considered.
Injunction to restrain the publication of future articles reflecting unfavorably on a company refused on the ground of the difficulty of granting an injunction which would not include matters that might turn out not to be
libellous, and, because if the injunction were granted in terms to restrain
what was libellous, the question of libel or no libel would have to be tried in
a very unsatisfactory way, on a motion to commit.
APPEAL

from the Chancery Division.
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COTTON, L. J.-This is an appeal from a decision of Mr.
Justice KEKEWICH, who declined to grant an interlocutory injunction in an action brought against the proprietors of a
newspaper, in respect of three alleged libels, the first being a
report of a meeting of the shareholders of the plaintiff company, published in the newspaper of the defendants, and the
others being two letters published in the same newspaper.
The injunction sought for, is not to restrain the future publication of these alleged libels, and for this reason, that there is
no probability of any republication in that paper, of the report of the meeting, and no probability that those letters will
be again sent to the paper. It is not necessary to decide the
question, how far, if those who regulate the affairs of a company invite the reporters of a newspaper to come to a private
meeting, the company can afterwards sue the newspaper for
publishing a full report of that meeting, because statements
made at the meeting were libellous. I think that would require some consideration. Nor is it necessary for us to consider how far the proprietors of the newspaper would be liable
for inserting letters commenting on what was said at the meeting of which they have published a report. We have not to
decide these questions because there is no probability that the
report of the meeting or these letters will be repeated, and
whether damages can be recovered for them is a question to
be decided only at the trial of the action. There is also another question to be considered at the trial, whether a company issuing a prospectus asking shareholders to join it, does
not to a certain extent invite public comment on its constitution, its capital, and its prospects. The injunction now asked
for is not an injunction to restrain the republication of the report or of the letters, but it is to restrain the defendants from
publishing "any articles, letters from correspondents, or any
other matter containing assertions, imputations, or suggestions
that the plaintiff company is insolvent or incapable of carrying on its business with success, or that the shareholders did
at the general meeting unanimously sign or propose a resolution to the effect that another general meeting of the company
should be convened for the purpose of taking into considera.tion whether the company should be wound up." Now there
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is really no suggestion that the defendants threaten or intend
to republish the statement as to the unanimous resolution.
Ought we then to grant an injunction with reference to the
future publication in this paper of things of the nature here
complained of? No doubt it may be very truly said, "I am
not bound by the notice of motion; I am entitled to go for
any injunction with regard to future publication that the
Court may grant me." But I agree with Mr. Justice KEKEWICH, that there would be the very greatest difficulty in laying down the terms in which we, in the present case, could
grant an injunction. In Coulson v. Coulson, 3 Times, L. R.
846, the Master of the Rolls said that to justify the Court in
granting an interim injunction, it must come to a decision on
the question of libel or no libel, before the jury decided
whether it was a libel or not, that the jurisdiction therefore
was of a delicate nature and ought only to be exercised in the
clearest cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained of was libellous, and where if the jury did not so find
the Court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable. That
is what the Master of the Rolls said with reference to an existing document, brought before the Court, and Lords Justices LINDLEY and LOPES concurred in that ruling. Now in the
case of an existing document brought before tle Court, the
Court can judge of its character, but how can the Court
judge whether documents, which are not yet in existence,
will be libellous? In my opinion, it would be very dangerous to grant an interlocutory injunction with reference
to future publication, unless we could lay down definitely
some line which would include only the publication of
what would necessarily be libellous. In my opinion, it
would be very unadvisable to grant any injunction, which
would restrain fair discussion in the newspapers, of matters
of importance like that of the probable success or failure
of a public company. Of course, if anything libellous is
published in the newspaper, there will be a right of action
against the proprietors, and they will be answerable; but I
feel that there would be the greatest danger in granting an interlocutory injunction such as is now asked for. Several cases
were cited in support of the case of the appellants. That of
VoL. XXXVI.-64
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Hill v. Hart Davies, 21 Ch. D., 798, 802, before KAY, J., is
the strongest The defendant there was the parson of a parish,
and published a circular containing statements with reference
to a friendly society to the effect that it was insolvent, and
that it would be dangerous to invest money in it. These
statements were proved to be incorrect; and then, with the
document before the Court proved to be incorrect, and defamatory and injurious to the plaintiff society, an interlocutory
injunction was granted in reference to the document, Mr. Justice KAY adding, "or any other circular or letter containing
false or inaccurate representations as to the credit or financial
condition of the said society." Whether he was right or
wrong in adding those words, I give no opinion; but there
was before the Court a document showing the nature of the
statements likely to be published by the defendant. The defendant, moreover, was not in the position of a newspaper.
I think that a newspaper occupies a peculiar position, especially with regard to matters concerning the interest of those
amongst whom the newspaper circulates, such as the discussion of the condition of a company like this. I do not say
that any statements or letters printed in the defendants' newspaper, making reflections of the character indicated in the
notice of motion, will not be libellous ; but I cannot say that
the jury would necessarily find them to be libellous. As regards Herman Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306, the main ground
for granting the injunction was one that does not exist in the
present case. There, the defendant had been in the employment of the plaintiff's firm, and was restrained from making
to their customers slanderous statements as to the plaintiff's
business, in making which he was guilty of a breach of duty
to his former employers. The Court abstained from giving
any opinion whether the defendant could be restrained from
making the statement to any persons other than the plaintiff's
customers. In no case do I find an injunction granted such
as is asked for here, an injunction as regards future publication of statements coming under such an indefinite description. Supposing we were to grant the injunction against
"libellous" letters, then it would have to be decided on motion
to commit, whether what was published was libellous or not;'
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and that would be a most inconvenient course to be adopted.
In my opinion, therefore, the appeal must fail.
LOPES, L. J. :-This is an application for an interlocutory
injunction to restrain libellous publications. It is clear that,
since the Judicature Act, the Court has power to restrain the
publication of libellous or slanderous matter, if it is immediately calculated to injure the person or trade of any one
against whom it is directed, but whether the jurisdiction
should be exercised or not, is a matter for the discretion of
the Court. We have to deal in the present case with the report and two letters, one published on the 21st, and the other
on the 24th of October. With regard to the report, it is clear
that the question whether it is privileged, must be left to be
decided at the trial, and if the publication should be held to
be privileged, it will be necessary for the plaintiffs to establish that there has been actual malice, which is not suggested
to exist in this case. The reporters, at the meeting in question, were present with the knowledge of the plaintiffs, if not
with their sanction. Are the reporters in such cases to give
an imperfect report, omitting all that is detrimental to the
company, and stating only what is in its favor? I do not
hesitate to say that any thing more undesirable or more calculated to mislead and bring about disastrous results can
scarcely be imagined. Passing from the report, I come to
the letters, and after what has been said by Lord Justice
COTTON, with which I agree, I have little to add. Speaking
for myself, it does not appear to me to be so perfectly clear,
taking all the circumstances into consideration, that the jury
will come to the conclusion that the letters which have been
published, were libels, as to justify the Court in granting an
interlocutory injunction against republishing them; and as
regards future letters of the description mentioned in the
notice of motion, it clearly is not so apparent that a jury will
find them libels, as to justify the Court in interfering in the
way asked. It would be most inconvenient to have the question of libel or no libel tried by the judge on motion to commit instead of being tried by a jury. I agree with all that
was said by the Master of the Rolls in Coudson v. Coulson, 3
Times L. R. 846, and in the present case my opinion is that
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the judge below was right, and that the appeal must be dis-

missed.
Before the Judicature Act of 1873,
the Court of Chancery claimed but a
limited jurisdiction to grant injunctions. Originally, indeed, as was
admitted by Sir GEoRGE JESSEL, in
Beddow v. Beddow, L. R. 9 Ch. Div.
89, it was subject to no other restriction in this respect than that the
exercise of the jurisdiction should be
reasonable and just, but its power
had, as he says, become " limited by
the practice of different chancellors.
The jurisdiction was never extended
in modern times beyond what was
warranted by the authorities ; and in
course of time various vexatious and
inconvenient restrictions were
adopted. The granting of an injunction was always looked upon as an
extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction.
* * * * The instances in which an
injunction might be granted were decided by the court, and there were
certain well-known cases in which it
was settled that the court ought not
to grant an injunction." Among
these cases was that of libel, whether
private or public, unless, indeed, the
libel were also a contempt of the
court: Roach v. Garvan, 2 Dick. 794;
s. c. 2 Atk. 469. See, on the latter
point, Brook v. Evans, 8 Weekly R.
688. The Star Chamber had, indeed,
restrained the publication of seditious
works, but Scroggs was impeached
for attempting to introduce the praotice into the King's Bench. The
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854
(17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, s. 79) gave the
courts of law extensive powers of
injunction, but only to prevent the
repetition or continuance of an injury
for which an action for damages had
already been brought.
It is true, that in Da Bost v. Beres-

ford, 2 Camp. 511, Lord ELLMOOROUGH
said of a libellous picture, "Upon an
application to the Lord Chancellor, he
would have granted an injunction
against its exhibition," but this dictum was never recognized as of any
authority, and in Gee v. Pritchard,2
Swanst. 402, 413, Lord ELnox said,
expressly, "The publication of the
libel is a crime; and I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of
crimes, excepting, of course, such
cases as belong to the protection of
infants." For many years, all attempts to change the rule were uniformly unsuccessful. In Martin v.
Wright, 6 Sim. 297 (1833), an enlarged
copy of a picture by the plaintiff had
been made as a diorama and advertised as "Mr. Martin's grand picture
of Belshazzar's Feast, painted with
dioramic effect." An injunction was
refused, SiADm=, V. C., saying,
"Then with respect to the defendant
representing his copy as Martin's
picture. It must either be better or
worse; if it is better, Martin had the
benefit of it; if worse, then the misrepresentation is only a sort of libel,
and this court will not prevent the
publication of a libel." Seeley v.
Fisher, 11 Sim. 581, is to the same
effect as to this latter point.
Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561
(1847), was no real exception to the
rule. The provisional directors of a
company were enjoined from publishing a prospectus in which the plaintiff
was stated to be a trustee, but the
decision rested wholly on the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name,
involving him in possible liabilities,
and no question of libel was raised.
. In Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112
(1848), the eminent physician, Sir
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James Clark, suught to enjoin a
chemist from advertising and selling
a quack medicine called "Sir James
Clarkp's Consumption Pills," it being
a highly injurious compound, if indiscriminately used, and, from the
clearly intentional similarity of
names, calculated to injure his reputation. The court admitted that the
plaintiff might be very seriously injured, but maintained that the fact
must first be established at law, before the continuance of the injury
could be enjoined. "I think," said
Lord LAaGDALE, M. R., "that granting
the injunction in this case would imply that the court has jurisdiction to
stay the publication of a libel, and I
cannot think it has." As his lordship had decided Routh v. Webster,
this makes it perfectly clear that he
did not hold that case to be one of
libel.
Fleming v. Newton, 1 H. L. C. 363
(1848), was an appeal from a decree
of the Court of Sessions, interdicting,
so far as concerned the plaintiff's
name, the publication of the register
of protests of bills and notes. The
case did not call for a decision on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions
to interdict the publication of libels,
but Lord COTTEXHm
expressed "an
earnest hope that, if this question
should arise and require a decision in
the Court of Sessions, and no distinct
rule should be found already to exist
upon the subject, the consequences
of any rule to be established for the
first time will be most carefully considered before such a rule is laid
down; and particularly that it may
be considered how the exercise of such
a jurisdiction can be reconciled with
the trial of matters of libel and defamation by juries, or, indeed, with
the liberty of the press."
The doctrine that a libellous publication could not be enjoined, was re-
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asserted, obiter, in 1861, in Emperor
of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. F. & J. 217.
The well-known rule that a criminal act which affects the enjoyment
of property, or works an injury thereto, may be enjoined on that ground
only (Mfacaulay v. Shackell, 1 Bligh
N. L. 96,127; Att.-Gen. v. Shef. Gas
Con. Co., 3 De G. M. & G. 304,320;
Emp. of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. F. &
J. 217, 253) worked one partial exception to the doctrine, viz: that if
the fact of libel had been found by a
jury, its further publication might
be enjoined as an injury to the plaintiff's property, or his means of gaining a livelihood: Clark v. Freeman,
supra; Cox v. Cox, 11 Hare, 118, 124.
The continuity of this course of decision was at length broken by ViceChancellor MALINS, who was strongly

convinced that the powers of the
court were in reality amply sufficient
to grant this form of relief, and had
been too long suffered to remain in
abeyance. In Springhead Spin. Co. v.
Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868), he
granted an injunction to restrain the
issuing of placards and advertisements, intimidating workmen and
preventing them from hiring themselves to the plaintiffs. As the value
of the plaintiffs' property was seriously affected by this course of boycotting, as it would now be called,
there was certainly ample cause for
the action of the court, provided it had
jurisdiction in the matter. The next
year he went a step further and in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7. Eq. 488, granted
a preliminary injunction against the
publication of a notice, stating that
the plaintiff was a member of a certain firm which had been adjudicated
bankrupt, but that he had defrauded
the creditors by concealing the fact
of his membership. Upon the hearing, the injunction was made perpetual, theVice-Chancellor saying, "'am
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told that a court of equity has no jurisdiction in such a case as this, though
it is admitted it has jurisdiction
where property is likely to be affected.
What is property? Oneman has property in lands, another in goods, another in a business, another in skill,
another in reputation; and whatever
may have the effect of destroying property in any one of these things (even In
a man's good name) is, in my opinion,
destroying property of a most valuable description. But here it is distinctly sworn to and cannot be denied,
that the effect of this will be seriously
damaging to the plaintiff's business
of a merchant * * * about the
most valuable kind of property that
he cau well have. * * * ButI go
further, and say, if it had only injured his reputation, it is within the
jurisdiction of this court to stop the
publication of a libel of this description which goes to destroy his property or his reputation, which is his
property, and if possible, more valuable than other property. * * * I
beg to be understood as laying down
that this court has jurisdiction to prevent the publication of any letter,
advertisement, or other document,
which, if permitted to go on, would
have the effect of destroying the property of another person, whether that
consists of tangible or intangible property, whether it consists of money or
reputation. Professional reputation
is the means of acquiring wealth, and
is the same as wealth itself."
In reaching this conclusion, the
Vice-Chancellor conceived himself to
be "fortified by authority." Without
denying the abstract reasonableness
of his views of the powers of the court,
he seems to have been mistaken
about the authority. The doctrine
that equity will prevent even a criminal injury to property had never
been carried so far. He held Routh v.

Webster, supra, as "going the whole
length of what is asked here," but
while this is in one sense true, both
cases involving statements that the
plaintiff belonged to a business concern, they were decided on such
wholly different grounds that the one
cannot be regarded as any authority
for the other. The Vice-Chancellor
went on to say that Lord LANGDALE
refused the injunction in Clarkv. Freeman "only because he did not think it
likely that such a thing could possibly prove an injury to the reputation
of a man in the position of Sir James
Clark." In view of Lord LANODAzB'S
unqualified statement of the real
ground of his decision, one is led to
believe that the Vice - Chancellor
quoted from memory.
In fulcern v. Ward, L. R. 13 Eq.
619 (1872), the rule attempted to be
established in Dixon v. Holden, is referred to as "wholly new," but Its
correctness is neither affirmed nor
denied, the case before the court
being held distinguishable.
Dixon v. Holden did not long pass
unchallenged. It was not followed
in Brown v. Freeman, Weekly Notes,
1873, 178, and was expressly overruled in Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875).
An injunction was prayed for against
the continued publication of a pamphlet containing statistics as to insurance companies, with comments
on their condition, but Lord CAIRNs
held that while the court "could re.
strain certain publications, it could
not do so merely because they were
libellous, and as no other reason
for its interference was alleged, he
refused the appeal, saying, "not
merely is there no authority for this
application, but the books afford
repeated instances of the refusal to
exercise jurisdiction." He referred
to Springhead Spin. Co. v. Riley and
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Dixon v. Holden, but thought them unwarranted by the decisions on which
they relied, and said "I am unable
to accede to these general propositiQus. They appear to me to be at
variance with the settled practice and
principles of this court, and I cannot accept them as an authority, for
the present application." The other
Lord Justices concurred in this view,
JAMEs, L. J., saying, " I think that
the Vice-Chancellor, in that case of
Dixon v. Holden, was, by his desire
to do what was right, led to exaggerate the jurisdiction of this court in
a manner for which there was no
authority in any reported case, and
no foundation in principle. I think
it right to say that I hold without
doubt that the statement of the law
in that case is not correct." To the
same effect, Fisherv. Apollinaris Co.,
Id. 297, 302.
The Judicature Act of 1873 (36 &
37 Vict. c. 66) took effect Nov. 2,
1874, a few months before these last
decisions, and in fact the decision
appealed from in Pirud. Ass. Co. v.
Knott was probably made before
that date. It seems, however, that
in neither case was that act claimed
to affect the matter. It provided
(§ 25, sub. § 8), that "an injunction
may be granted * ** by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases
in which it shall appear to be just or
convenient that such order should be
made; and any such order may be
made either unconditionally or upon
such terms and conditions as the
court shall think just."
It was apparently not until 1877
that this act was claimed to have
altered the law as to libel, and, by a
rather curious coincidence, the first
case came before Vice-Chancellor MALINs--Torley's Cattle Food Co. v. 3fassam, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 582 (1877) ; on appeal 14 Id. 763, 782 (1880).
The
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defendants had published in various
newspapers an advertisement stating
that they "are alone possessed of
the secret for compounding" the
cattle food, and warning the public
" against the course pursued by a
company which has lately been
registered with a nominal capital of
only R200, and a paid-up capital of a
few shillings, in seeking to foist upon
the public an article which they pretend is the same as that manufactured
by the late Joseph Thorley."
Finding the advertisement to be untrue
and misleading, and calculated to
injure the plaintiffs in their business,
the Vice-Chancellor held that the
thing ought to be stopped, and that
if he were not fettered by authority
he "should, without the slightest
hesitation, have granted an injunction to prevent the continuance of
such a practice as this. * ** In my
own individual opinion, I have not
the slightest doubt whatever that it
is, and it ought to be, as much the
principle of this court to stop publications which go to destroy property
as to prevent the darkening of ancient
lights, or the trespassing upon property, or anything else which goes to
the destruction of property."
He
admitted, however, that the opinion
expressed in Prudential Ass. Co. v.
Knott stood in the way, though he
thought that case rightly decided on
the facts, and clearly distinguishable
from Springhead Spin. Co. v. Riley
and Dixon v. Holden. His own opinion
was in favor of the plaintiffs' contention, that the force of PrudentialAss.
Co. v. Knott was nullified by the act,
but as the point was a new one, involving considerations of the highest
possible importance, he would not
decide it on an interlocutory application, and refused the motion, thereby reserving the question for decision
on the hearing of the cause.
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The courts were at first slow to
adopt the Vice-Chancellor's view of
the act. In Rinrichs v. Berndes,
Weekly Notes, 1878, page 11, the
Master of the Rolls admitted himself
unprepared to answer the question,
and in Saxby v. Easterbrook, L. R. 3 C.
P. D. 339, in the same year, Lord
COLRRxDoz referred to the act and said,
"I confess I do not appreciate its application to the matter." In that
case an injunction was granted after
verdict, LiNDLEY, J., saying, "The
principle upon which the courts of
equity have acted in declining to restrain the publication of matter alleged to be libellous, is, that the question of libel or no libel is pre-eminently
for a jury. But when the jury have
found the matter complained of to be
libellous, and that it affects property,
I see no principle by which the court
ought to be precluded from saying
that the repetition of the libel shall
be restrained."
A month later, the effect of the Judicature Act was explained by Sir
Gaoa, JESSEL in Beddow v. 3eddow,
L. R. 9 Ch. D. 89, already cited. The
case was not one of libel, but he made
no distinction as to the object sought
by the injunction. After referring to
the former limited jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery in this respect, see
supra, and to the fact that the new act
extended to all the courts the power
of injunction given to common law
courts by the Common Law Procedure
Act of 1854, and also to the wide
terms used in the Judicature Act, he
proceeded, "It appears tome that the
only limit to my power of granting
an injunction is whether I can properly do so. In my opinion, having
regard to these two acts of Parliament,
I have unlimited power to grant an
injunction in any case where it would
be right or just to do so; and what is
right or just must be decided, not by

the caprice of the judge, but according to sufficient legal reasons or on
settled legal principles."
This case was considered reasonably enough, by MALINS, V. C., as settling the question in favor of the view
he had maintained through evil report and good report, for this is clearly
the case to which he meant to refer in
Day v. Brownrigg, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 294,
300, though the report makes him
rely on Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29,
obviously a misprint. Accordingly,
the second stage of Thorley's Cattle
Food Co. v. Massam (L. R. 14 Ch. D.
763) found his opinion unaltered as
to the law, "that, where one man
publishes that which is injurious to
another in his trade and business,
that publication is actionable, and,
being actionable, will be stayed by
injunction, because it is a wrong
which ought not to be repeated." In
view of the facts proved in the case,
he granted a perpetual injunction,
and his decision was affirmed on appeal. Neither in his reported opinion
nor in those of the Court of Appeals
is there any reference to Prudential
Ass. Co. v. Knott, or the effect of the
act upon it. That the act did control
it, seems to be tacitly admitted. Torley's Cattle Food Co. v. 3Massam was
followed in the same year in Thomas
v. Williams, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 864,
where Fay, J., after reviewing the
facts, said, "In the next place, it is
said that, this being a libel, no injunction ought to be granted in respect of it. I am at a loss to see why
a libel affecting property or trade may
not be the subject of an injunction.
It is not necessary for me to point out
the evident intention of the Legislature, as indicated by the 25th section
of the Judicature Act of 1873, to enlarge rather than diminish the power
of the court in respect of injunctions,"
and on adverting to the authorities,
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he pointed out that JAWEs, L. J., one
of the judges in Thorley's Cattle Food
Co. v. 31assam, had been a party to
the decision in TrudentialAss. Co. v.
Knott.
The rule once admitted, there was
a general "falling into line." In
Quartz Hill Cons. G. 3. Co. v. Beall,
L. R. 20 Ch. D. 501 (1882), BACON,
V. C., granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant
from publishing a circular or advertisement, containing certain statements, "or otherwise libellous or
defamatory to the company or the
property, title to property, value of
assets, or financial position of the
This was dissolved on
company."
appeal, on the ground that the circular was a privileged communication,
but the jurisdiction since the JudicaThis juristure Act was admitted.
diction, it was however agreed, must be exercised with the utmost possible
caution.
In Hill v. Davies, L. R. 21 Ch. D.
798 (1882), a circular calculated to
injure the credit or financial standing
of a friendly society was enjoined.
Tho same general principle was followed in Briton Life Assn. v. Roberts,
2 Times L. R. 319, and Coulson v.
Coulson, 3 Id. 846, but in the latter
case Lord EsHEr, M.R., observed that
"it was a most delicate jurisdiction
to exercise. * * * To justify the
court in granting an interim injunction it must come to a decision on the
question of libel or no libel, before
the jury decided whether it was a libel or not. * * * It ought only
to be exercised in the clearest cases,
where any jury would say that the
matter complained of was libellous,
and where, if the jury did not so find,
the court would set aside the verdict
as unreasonable." Armstrong v. Armit,
2 Id. 887, in the Queen's Bench Division, is to the same effect.
VoL. XXXVI.-65
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In Herrmann Loog v. Bean, L. R.
26 Ch. D. 306 (1884) ; s. c. 23 Am.
Law Reg. 701 (with note), the rule
was held to cover cases of slander
also. The defendant had been dismissed from the plaintiffs' service,
and the injunction sought was to restrain him, inter alia, "from stating to
the plaintiffs' customers, or any other
person, or persons, that the plaintiffs were about to stop payment, or
were in difficulties, or insolvent, or
making any statements to the above
or like effect, and from in any manner
slandering the plaintiffs or injuring
their reputation or business." In the
Chancery Division, PEARsoN, J., said,
"On that part of the case, independently of any other question, there
must be an injunction to restrain the
defendant from continuing such proceedings." This was affirmed in the
Court of Appeal, CoTTON, L. J., saying, "Here is a man who had been in
the employ of the plaintiffs, making
to their customers slanderous statements with regard to the business of
the company * * * The Court has
of late granted injunctions in cases
of libel, and why should it not also
do so in cases of slander? It-is clear
that slanderous 3tatements such as
were made to old customers in this
case, must have a tendency materially to injure the plaintiffs' business;
they are slanders, therefore, spoken
against their trade. It is not necessary therefore in my opinion to show
that loss has actually been incurred
in consequence of them. If they are
calculated to do injury to the trade,
the plaintiffs may clearly come to the
court. There is, no doubt more difficulty in granting an injunction as
regards spoken words than as regards
written statements, because it is difficult to ascertain exactly what is said.
But when the defendant is proved to
have made certain definite state-

504

LIVERPOOL HOUSEHOLD STORES ASSOCIATION v. SMITH.

ments, such as are mentioned in the
order, in my opinion an injunction is
properly granted to prevent his repeating them. The defendant, though
no doubt the tongue is an unruly
member to govern, must take care
that he keeps his tongue in order,
and does not allow it to repeat those
statements which he is, by the injunction, restricted from uttering."
BOWEN, L. J., also said, " There is a
wrong done which is actionable if it
has been committed, and which
naturally would, if repeated or persisted in, affect injuriously the property or trade of the plaintiff company. It has been held since the
Judicature Act that a plaintiff is entitled to the protection of the court
against a wrong of that sort which is
contained in a written document. * * *
Can there be any distinction in principle between a slander which is contained in a written document and a
slander which is not ?" And he held
that the pame rule must govern both.
It was on the authority of these
latter cases that Lord Justice LOPES
was able to say, in the principal case,
" It is clear that since the Judicature
Act, the court has power to restrain
the publication of libellous or slanderous matter, if it is immediately
calculated to injure the person or
trade of any one against whom it is
directed." Such is now the law in
England, and it is a noteworthy extension of the powers of a court of
equity beyond these recognized in
Lord ELnoN's time, when in Gee v.
Pritchard, supra, he cut short the
counsel, who was adverting to the
contention that the letters under consideration were libellous, with the
observations, "It will notbe necessary
to trouble you with that view of the
case. The publication of the libel is
a crime; and I have no jurisdiction
to prevent the commission of crimes.

* * * The question will be, whether
the bill has stated facts of which the
court will take notice." What was
then held to be wholly outside the
consideration of the court is now a
substantial feature of its jurisdiction.
The American cases are few, and
are practically unanimous in upholding the former English rule.
In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic S.
Xl. Co., 49 Ga. 70 (1872), the plaintiff
had published a report of a cominittee of the State Agricultural
Society, declaring the plaintiff's
machine the best that they had inspected in the competition, and the
defendant had published a statement
that the report as set forth by the
plaintiff was untrue, and that the
decision had been in favor of the
defendant's machine. The court refused the injunction, on the authority
of the earlier English cases, saying,
" If a wrong capable of redress before
the courts at all, it comes more nearly
within the definition of a libel, or of
slander concerning one's trade and
business, than anything else. Equity,
it must be remembered, will not
enjoin every wrong. * * * Libel and
slander, however outrageous, will not
be enjoined * * * The principle is,
that, to authorize the writ, there
must be an irreparable expected
injury to a property right. It is a
perversion of language to say that the
complainant has a property right in
the truth of the report. He has, perhaps, a right to the report, but a
perversion of the truth, a claim that
it is different from what it in fact is,
can in no fair sense be called an infringement of his right of property
in the report." To this latter statement it might be answered that as
the report could only be of value if it
were believed to be true, anything
calculated to impair that belief would
necessarily impair the value of the
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report, and of whatever propertyright there might be in it.
In 1880, the Supreme Court of the
same' State expressed an opinion in
direct conflict with the above. In
Bell v. Singer Mfg. Co., 65 Ga. 452,
the defendant had issued a circular,
charging the plaintiffs with violation
of the defendant's patent. The injunction was refused on the facts as
presented, but the court said, "We
recognize the rule that a court of
equity upon a proper case has the
power to enjoin the publication and
circulation of a libel, and that the
principle is applicable to equitable
rights arising under the patent laws
of the United States, where the
legality of the patent is not the subject of inquiry, but the patent right
is only collateral to the relief sought."
_No authorities are cited, nor are any
reasons given, but it is a significant
fact that the court was composed of
judges, all of whom had come to the
bench since the decision made eight
years before. Whether the change
of doctrine is due to anything more
fundamental than rotation in judicial
office, we are left to conjecture.
In Massachusetts, the former English rule has been consistently followed: Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence
3fg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873), where
Dixon v. Holden, supra, is disapproved; Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Id.
484 (1876) ; and Raymond v. Russell,
143 Id. 295 (1887), apparently the
most recent American case on the
point, and where _Find. Ass. Co. v.
Knott, supra, is relied on as law.
In Life Ass'n of America v. Boogher,
3 Mo. App. 173 (1876), the petition
for the injunction set forth the fact
of the libel, and also alleged that the
defendants "were wholly insolvent
and irresponsible, and that the plaintiff had, therefore, no available recourse to an action for damages." A
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preliminary injunction was granted,
but dissolved on demurrer, and this
judgment was affirmed in the Court of
Appeals, on the authority ofBrandret
v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24, and the earlier
English cases. To the argument that
the defendants were insolvent, the
court said, "It is obvious that if this
remedy be given on the ground of the
insolvency of the defendant, the freedom to speak and write, which is
secured by the Constitution of Missouri to all its citizens, will be
enjoyed by a man able to respond in
damages to a civil action, and denied
to one who has no property liable to
an execution. We are of opinion
that this discrimination was not intended by the framers of the organic
law." The court went on to admit,
that, irrespective of such insolvency,
"there is much room for saying that
the legal remedy falls short of making
full compensation for injury done or
of giving full protection against injury threatened;" but added, "To
infer from this that recourse may be
had to the preventive jurisdiction of
a court of equity is clearly not allowable. No human institutions are
perfect." The bill of rights was referred to, and it was observed that
"If it be said that the right to speak,
write, or print, thus secured to every
one, cannot be construed to mean a
license to wantonly injure another,
and that by the jurisdiction claimed
it is only suspended until it can be
determined judicially whether the
exercise of it in the particular case
be allowable, our answer is that we
have no power to suspend that right
for a moment, or for any purpose.
The sovereign power has forbidden
any instrumentality of the government it has instituted, to limit or restrain this right, except by the fear
of the penalty, civil or criminal,
which may wait on abuse."
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In Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24
(1839), the old 'New York Court of
Chancery held to the English rule
then in force, on the authority of Gee
v. P'itchard,supra, and this precedent
has been held to bind the courts of
to-day in the exercise of their equity
powers: N. Y. Juv. Guard. Soc. v.
Roosevelt, 7 Daly, 188 (1877); Mauger
v. Dick, 55 How. Pr. 132 (1878);
Molfe v. Burke, 56 N. Y. 115 (1874),
was a somewhat analogous case, an
injunction to restrain the defendants
from interfering with the plaintiffs'
business by threats, circulars, suits, or
injunctions, being refused, but there
were so many grounds for the decision that it does not constitute an authority on the point under consideration. In Crot v. Richardson, 59 Ilow.
Pr. 356 (1880), however, the New
York Supreme Court, finding that the
defendants were "publishing false
and malicious libels concerning the
plaintiffs' business, and their business character and transactions,"
granted an injunction on the authority of the second decision in Thorley's
Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, supra.
In the recent case of Kidd v. Ilorry,
28 Fed. R. 773 ; s. c. sub nom. Kidd v.
Smith, 25 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 730,
BRADLEY, J., reviews the English and
American authorities, points to the
powers granted by the Judicature Act
as the sole foundation of the present
English doctrine, and says, "Neither
the statute law of this country, nor
any well-considered judgment of the
courts, has introduced this new
branch of equity into our jurisprudence. There may be a case or two
looking that way, but none that we
deem of sufficient authority to justify
us in assuming the jurisdiction. * *
We do not regard the contrary decision in Croft v. Richardson [supra]
sufficient authority to counteract
these cases, or to disturb what we con-

sider to be the well-established law
on the subject. That law clearly is
that the Court of Chancery will not
Interfere by injunction to restrain
the publication of a libel [citing Frud.
Ass. Co. v. Knott]. * * * If this
decision has since been overruled, it
is only because of the enlarged jurisdiction conferred upon the English
courts by the statutes referred to. It
is a standard authority on the general law, independent of legislation.
* * * Charges of libel and slander
are peculiarly adapted to and require
trial by jury, and exercising, as we
do, authority under a system of government and law which, by a fundamental article, secures the right of
trial by jury in all cases at common
law, and which, by express statute,
declares that suits in equity shall not
be sustained in any case where a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy
may be had at law, as has always
heretofore been considered the case in
cases of libel and slander, we do not
think that we would be justified in
extending the remedy of injunction
to such cases."
This decision is undoubtedly a correct statement of the law as it has
hitherto been almost invariably held
in the United States. The isolated
cases in Georgia and New York, cited
above, show, indeed, that it is possible for some of our courts to abandon
the old rule, but as neither case contains any argument in support of the
conclusion reached, they can hardly
be regarded as authority. At most
they may be straws showing how the
judicial wind is beginning to blow.
In view of the direct opposition, at
present existing between the English
and American rules, a few observations may not be inappropriate. The
usual argument against attempting
to enjoin the publication of a libel or
the repetition of a slander is that such
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action on the part of the court would
be an interference with trial by jury,
and freedom of speech and of the
pres;. The danger of such interference certainly calls for great caution
in allowing such injunctions, as was
recognized in the principal case, and
in some of the others cited above, but
as long as this caution is exercised,
the interference is more apparent
than real. If a judge, sitting in
equity, only diminishes the evil result
of what a jury would unquestionably
condemn ; if he checks the evil more
speedily than a jury could do, there
is certainly no interference with justice. Besides, the plaintiff has rights
as well as the defendant. Freedom
of speech and freedom from unmerited
attacks on character and credit must
stand on equally high ground as
natural rights, while, among those
rights which take their rise in legal
institutions, the aid of a court of
equity to prevent irreparable wrong
is often not less valuable than trial
byjury itself; and irreparable wrong
(the prospect of which must exist to
warrant any injunction) may be
caused by an abuse of the right of
free speech as easily as by anything
else. The objection that trial by jury
is interfered with, can, from one point
of view, be made to every injunction
that is not granted after a trial has
been had at law. The proper test for
the granting of an injunction must be
the irreparable character of the injury, not the particular manner in
which it was inflicted.
The fact that the highest English
courts see fit to exercise their new
power, and believe that they further
the interests of justice thereby, is
in itself an argument, and one still
stronger is found in the fact that they
did not shrink from claiming the
power, though it came to them con-
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cealed, as it were, in the general
terms of the act.
The rise of the former English
practice, and its subsequent abandonment, are not far to seek. When
the recognition of the right to trial
by jury had to be wrested from an
unwilling monarch, when freedom of
speech was restricted, and the voice
of the press yet unheard, it was expedient that the Court of Chancery
should avoid even the appearance of
interfering with popular rights, but
when they became firmly established,
the rule ceased to be much more than
a technicality. The court could not
enjoin a libel because it never had
done so. Sir RICHARD MAINS tried
to break down the rule, and his
judgments were overruled, not because they were inequitable, but
because they were unprecedented.
When the statutory grant of general
powers of injunction overcame this
objection, the judges did not long
hesitate to exercise those powers in
this new way.
Now the American rule is unquestionably founded on that of the former English Courts of Chancery. If
the rule be only technical, then it
cannot bind American courts unless
they are constituted with the same
limited powers of injunction that that
court was considered to possess. If
they are so limited, of course the recent English cases are no precedent
for them, and legislation alone can
change their practice; but any court
with power to grant an injunction
whenever such action appears "on
settled legal principles" to be "right
or just" (see Beddow v.Beddow, supra),
would seem to be justified in following the present English practice.
Apart from English precedents,
however, BRADLRY, J., Kidd v. Horry,
supra, declares the right to equitable
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relief in the Federal courts to depend
on the absence of a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy at law, and
that this remedy exists in cases of
libel and slander. As is admitted in
Life Assn. v. .Boogher, supra, this
latter assertion may be open to doubt.
Should it ever cease to command judicial acquiescence, a strong argument
in favor of the old rule would be
removed.
It is to be observed that all the
English cases recognizing the power
to grant injunctions involve "trade
libels" only, calculated to injure the
plaintiff's credit or business reputation. The principal case is no exception to the rule, but Lord Justice
LoPEs did not confine the doctrine to
such cases. He said, "The court has
power to restrain the publication of
libellous or slanderous matter, if it is
immediately calculated to injure the
person or trade of any one against
whom it is directed." While there
seems to be no reported case of an injunction against a personal libel, unconnected with the business of a company or individual, there is no reason
why all kinds of libel should not be
subject to the same rule in this respect. Clark v. Freeman, supra, involving as it did the professional
reputation of a physician of eminence,
comes perhaps nearer a strictly personal libel than any of the other
cases, especially as at that time the
social distinction between a profession
and a trade was much more marked

than at present. At all events, it
serves to show how closely personal
and trade libels are connected. It
was not without reason that ViceChancellor MALixs said, in Dixon v.
Holden, supra, that a man's reputation
is his property, and this must be
irrespective of whether he be engaged
in business or not. Of course the
injury inflicted by libels upon the
character or credit of persons engaged
in business is much more likely to be
of that irreparable character which
calls for the intervention of a court
of equity than is to be expected in
cases of purely personal libel, but it
can hardly be asserted that these
cases can never come properly before
such a court.
Extensive as is the jurisdiction of
the English courts with regard to injunctions in general, the principal
case clearly shows that the exercise of
this jurisdiction is limited, in cases
of libel, by certain well-recognized
restrictions. Mirst. Whether the injunction be interlocutory or final,
there must be such proof of the fact
of libel or slander as would satisfy a
jury. Second. The language or character of the publications or verbal
statements forbidden must be definitely described. If the caution displayed by the court in the principal
case be always observed, there will
be little chance of complaint of interference with popular rights.
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